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Abstract
One of the most convincing explanations papers generally provide concerning clusters
in knowledge-based economies refers to the geographically bounded dimension of
knowledge spillovers. Here, we shall underline that location decision externalities
precede local knowledge spillovers in the explanation of cluster aggregate efficiency,
which thus requires us to focus on the sequential process of location and the nature
of interdependences in location decision-making. To that end, we mean to associate
cluster emergence with the formation of locational norms, and to study the critical
parameters of their stability. These parameters relate to the type of decision
externalities among more or less cognitively distant firms, which influences the
weight and the resulting ambivalent role of knowledge spillovers at the aggregate level
of clusters. We suggest two theoretical propositions which we test within a simple and
general norm location dynamics modeling framework. We then proceed to discuss the
results so obtained by comparing them with an emerging related literature based on
the life cycle and viability of clusters.
Keywords: clusters, location under decision externalities, cognitive distance, knowledge spillovers
JEL classifications: D83, L86, R12
Date submitted: 16 January 2008 Date accepted: 21 November 2008
1. Introduction
Innovative clusters have been the subject of growing attention based on the role they
play in the knowledge-based economy (Martin and Sunley, 2003). Most of the papers
generally refer to the geographically bounded dimension of knowledge spillovers
(Breschi and Lissoni, 2001). Studies of local knowledge spillovers are particularly suited
to explain the causal relations between existing agglomerations of activities and
aggregate performance at regional level, but they are less relevant to explain the reasons
why some clusters succeed whereas others decline. Indeed, some of the ‘Silicon- or
‘Valley-type’ clusters, which were fashionable in the late nineties and during the Internet
bubble, have since declined [such as the French Silicon Sentier or the well-known
Silicon Alley (Dalla Pria and Vicente, 2006; Vicente and Suire, 2007)], while others
(such as the emblematic Silicon Valley or the French Telecom Valley) have stood up to
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The geographical charisma (Appold, 2005) clusters display is not a guarantee of their
collective efficiency and geographical proximity between firms may, under specific
conditions, give rise to fragility and instability.
The purpose of this article is to show how the intrinsic performance of clusters can be
analyzed through a focus on the sequential process of location and the nature of
interdependences in location decision-making. To that end, we set out to associate
cluster emergence with the formation of locational norms, and to study the critical
parameters of their stability. These parameters refer to the type of decision externalities
among more or less cognitively distant firms that influences the weight and the resulting
ambivalent role of knowledge spillovers at the aggregate level of clusters. We then
propose a dynamic approach, in line with an evolutionary economic geography
framework (Boschma and Martin, 2007), in that it focuses on a complex micro–macro
process of location decision-making, which implies an out-of-equilibrium perspective
(Boschma and Frenken, 2006). Such a framework makes it possible to capture
interesting cluster pathways, such as path dependence, lock-in, lock-out and phase
transitions. More precisely, we are close to an emerging related literature based on the
life cycle of clusters (Menzel and Fornahl, 2007; Ter Wal and Boshma, 2007) in order to
better capture why and how clusters, as well as the collective advantages associated with
them, change over time.
Sections 2 and 3 provide general considerations and definitions on knowledge
interactions and the colocation process under decision externalities. Section 4 develops
a set of testable propositions on the parameters of cluster stability. Section 5 puts
forward a simple norm location dynamics model under decision externalities,
presents the simulation results and discusses their relevance compared to the main
stylized facts on cluster aggregate efficiency.
2. Uncertainty, legitimacy and knowledge interactions in
location decision-making
The literature on clusters stresses the role of knowledge interactions among
complementary firms (Cooke, 2001), especially in high-tech sectors where knowledge
generation depends on the combination of existing and fragmented knowledge
(Antonelli, 2006). A striking argument is that geographical proximity favors tacit
knowledge interactions among cognitively distant firms. Following Nooteboon (2000),
a certain amount of cognitive distance between partners gives rise to a higher
probability of knowledge creation than an excess of cognitive proximity,
1 but it also
leads to some misunderstanding situations which require frequent meetings. Thus,
geographical proximity increases the respective knowledge absorption capabilities
of partners, and so favors accessibility to external knowledge. However,
cluster embeddedness is not a panacea for firms’ innovative performance due to the
risks of knowledge under-appropriation and unintended knowledge spillovers
1 See also Boschma (2005) and Brossard and Vicente (2007).
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is strong so that firms operate within markets that are differentiated enough to
avoid the knowledge hold-up phenomenon (Kogut, 1988). High-tech clusters
around the world draw their geographical charisma from this knowledge network
effect which engenders permanent novelty in the early stages of a technology’s life
cycle. On the other hand, too weak a cognitive distance may appear as a handicap
when there is not a sufficient amount of variety introduced into the networks
of innovative firms. In that case, clusters may thus come to be locked in an
under-competitiveness syndrome as a result of an excess of conformism
(Boschma, 2005).
Nevertheless, a more marginal part of the literature highlights other features of
the regional clusters’ geographical charisma which, in some respects, are at variance
with the increasing literature on local knowledge networks. These features refer to
the interplaying uncertainty decrease and search for legitimacy in location decision-
making (Appold, 2005; Dalla Pria and Vicente, 2006; Vicente and Suire, 2007). Appold
(2005) shows that the agglomeration of innovative firms in US science parks takes
place without there being any network effects or functional knowledge interdepen-
dences implied. Clusters emerge and grow through ‘mimetic isomorphism’ (Di Maggio
and Powell, 1983) leading to collective legitimacy, and not necessarily to collective
and organizational efficiency. Uncertainty in location decision-making can be identified
as the main reason accounting for both the search for legitimacy and herding locational
behavior. Appold notes that ‘a manager could conclude that the number of successful
laboratories at a particular site is an indicator of its productivity’ (p. 21), without there
being any further information on the intrinsic characteristics of the territories or on
the site’s relational potential. The location of cognitively close firms in an area is
perceived as a signal for the others, which produces a so-called bandwagon effect
(Leibenstein, 1950). Dalla Pria and Vicente (2005) and Vicente and Suire (2007)
have identified a similar phenomenon in the emblematic French case of the Silicon
Sentier, a cluster gathering over 300 pure players and Internet companies in a forsaken
area of central Paris. In this peculiar case, the location of Yahoo—regarded as a fashion
leader in the sector—in 1997, had contributed to the construction of a locational
norm (or ‘signal location’) which provided new entrants in e-business with the
legitimacy they did not have due to their recent creation. Furthermore, in this case, the
weakness of knowledge relations and the low cognitive distance between firms
appeared as a key feature of this end of nineties successful ICT cluster.
At this stage, the wide-ranging proposition of this article is that the dynamic stability
of clusters depends on the nature of the sequential process of colocation, as well as on
the nature of decision externalities at play in the aggregative location process. More
precise propositions will be defined hereafter, which will emphasize the critical
parameters concerning the very upstream phase of the motives for location decision-
making. The correlative idea is that knowledge spillovers could have differentiated
effects according to whether firms follow the location of others (relevant predecessors)
in order to (i) reduce uncertainty among location alternatives and increase their
legitimacy, or (ii) find partners and have access to external knowledge. Finally, as
underlined by Ter Wal and Bohsma (2007): ‘The uncertainty and lack of knowledge
about who are the main players in the field initially lead to a highly unstable network
structure.’
A social interaction model of cluster viability . 3o f2 43. Social interactions under mimetic pressures
Why do agents converge on location decision-making? One of the most promising social
interaction mechanisms accounting for such a convergence process stresses the role
played by mimetic behaviors and decision externalities. Social interactions based on
mimetic behaviors have been the subject of a growing literature in economics (Banerjee,
1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992, 1998; Manski, 2000; Orle ´ an, 2006), but also in soci-
ology (Granovetter, 1978; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hedstrom, 1998; Strang and
Macy, 2001; Watts, 2006). The basic idea is that interactions are always sequential. This
assumption is crucial for at least one reason: it permits to introduce into the interaction
mechanisms the possibility for agents to observe the decision of others, and more
generally to enter the black box of decision externalities leading to cumulative
processes.
We can distinguish two kinds of motives for agents to adopt mimetic behaviors or to
converge upon the same decision, irrespective of geographical considerations at this
stage. Each of these motives involves different properties of aggregate outcomes in
terms of collective behavior stability.
The first of these motives relates to uncertainty and legitimacy. When agents face
uncertainty in their decision-making, it would seem rational for them to emulate others
and to decide on the basis of an observational-learning process (Manski, 2000).
Bikhchandani et al. (1992, 1998) have developed a herding behavior model where
observation of others is the key criterion of (sequential) interactions. Bikhchandani
et al. show that, under specific conditions, agents can converge quickly in terms of
decision making, which leads to conformity effects such as fads or fashions. It is
important to point out here that this convergence process—the so-called informational
cascade—rests on very little information, which is sometimes limited to the only
information available through the private signals of the first adopters in a community.
In the well-known sociological approach of DiMaggio and Powell (1983), uncertainty
also appears as a strong source of mimetic interactions in the dynamics of collective
behaviors. DiMaggio and Powell try to capture convergence processes in decision
making through the concept of institutional isomorphism, which can be defined as the
constrained process that forces an agent in a population to resemble the other agents
experiencing a similar economic or social context. As a matter of fact, organizations
such as firms can converge upon the same organizational design and market strategy—
and so upon a low cognitive distance (Nooteboon, 2000)—owing more to a mimetic
process than to sometimes costly experimentations and explorations of organizational
alternatives or market niches. The need for legitimacy is the corollary of these
uncertainty-based mimetic interactions. Essentially developed in sociology, this idea is
introduced as well in the model of Bikhchandani et al. through the so-called notion of
‘fashion leaders’, i.e. agents having such an expertise capacity and reputation that they
can influence the trajectories of collective choices in the early stages of or during the
clustering process. It would be more legitimizing to emulate other agents that may be
acknowledged as being endowed with a strong reputation and legitimacy. Legitimacy is
a strong source of rational imitative behaviors in the works of Hedstrom (1998) too. It
would be rational to follow others in view of the belief according to which imitation is a
useful strategy to obtain valued positions or resources, and to avoid being marginalized
within communities. In a more institutional way of thinking, DiMaggio and Powell
insist on the fact that mimetic processes leading to institutional isomorphism are based
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in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful’ (p. 152). They put
forward the idea that agents are more likely to follow the decisions of well-reputed
other agents than to assess whether these decisions enhance efficiency or not. So,
uncertainty and legitimacy appear as strong motives giving rise to collective behaviors,
and they certainly contribute, to a certain extent, to the above discussed low cognitive
distance.
The second motive explaining convergence in decision making through sequential
and mimetic processes refers to the question of accessibility to and exchange of
knowledge, as well as to the benefits agents can derive from their connection with
a network. In economics, one of the most convincing approaches is represented by
Arthur’s model on increasing returns to adoption (Arthur, 1990).
2 In a formal way, the
models of increasing returns to adoption are based on the notion of network
externalities. The payoffs agents may derive from their connection with a network are
positively correlated with the number of previously connected agents. The basic idea
is that the higher the number of connected agents, the higher the probability for an
agent to communicate, to exchange or to capture strategic information in order to
increase its satisfaction. This increasing satisfaction depends strongly on compatibility
and complementarity criteria governing interactions and communication among
connected agents. For Arthur, theses problems are essentially technological ones.
However, we can easily show that these could also fall within the scope of knowledge
dynamics. Agents tend to follow the adoption decision of others not only because of
uncertainty or legitimacy, but also because of knowledge exchange and accessibility
constraints. In a complex and systemic view of knowledge (Antonelli, 2006; Sorenson
et al., 2006), firms will have a stronger chance of having access to external and
complementary bits of knowledge stemming from cognitively distant firms if the
number of firms connected with the knowledge network is high, thus reinforcing the
attractiveness of the network as a whole (Vicente and Suire, 2007).
So, uncertainty, legitimacy, coordination and knowledge accessibility in networks are
strong motives for mimetic interactions and can account for the emergence of collective
behaviors. One of the most interesting extensions worth developing requires an
investigation of the complex relations between the individual motives for imitation and
the economic properties of collective behavior stability.
3 The key criterion highlighting
these relations, both in economics and in sociology, pertains to the nature of the payoff
functions. For instance, in Arthur’s model, as underlined by Geroski (2000), Orle ´ an
(2006) and Vicente and Suire (2007), the process of preferential imitation is based on an
evolving payoff structure. Payoffs are an increasing function of the number of agents
converging upon the same choice. Individual utility increases as the agents converge
upon the same decision. The mimetic process which governs the emergence of collective
behavior thus engenders a strong stability in time, as well as in space (the so-called path
dependency). Conversely, when the informational effect plays a major role through
uncertainty and legitimacy, the intrinsic utility of agents and their payoffs are not
2 Orle ´ an (2006) alludes to ‘preferential imitation’ to qualify Arthur’s model, thus establishing a clear
difference with ‘informational imitation’ as developed in the model of Bikhchandani et al.
3 We define stability in a dynamic and evolutionary sense, i.e. stability in terms of performance and growth,
and not within the scope of the neoclassical stability property, which is strongly associated with the notion
of equilibrium (Boschma and Lambooy, 1999).
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in decision making can bring about negative externalities or self-defeating processes
(Hedstrom, 1998), for instance when collective choices lead to congestion effects or to
strong competing pressures. Thus, collective behavior resulting from an informational
cascade is fragile. Bikhchandani et al. (1998) already identified these differentiated
properties of stability when they observed that ‘in many realistic settings, in addition
to the informational externality described here, there are direct payoff interactions in a
form of positive consumption of production externalities – sometimes called network
externalities. The intuition here is that joining a network may help both the joiner and the
others who have already joined. Uniformity is likely in the presence of network
externalities. However, this uniformity does not display the fragility of an informational
cascade’ (p. 168).
4. Cluster emergence and stability under decision
externalities: two testable propositions
All of the aforementioned general considerations lead to the following propositions
concerning specifically clusters springing from the aggregative process of location
decision-making.
Proposition 1: A cluster will be even more likely to emerge if the informational effect comes into
play in the early stages of the location process. The weight of this effect will be even stronger if
pioneer firms are perceived as fashion leaders by the others.
Again it is to be pointed out that the informational effect comes into play when
uncertainty is strong. First, location decision-making can be imbued with strong
uncertainty when firms are not characterized by high transportation costs and a clearly
identified local labor force, so that there is no real place prevailing among the range of
alternative locations they have at their disposal. This situation is typical of economic
activities of the so-called weightless economy (Quah, 2000) where intangible production
does not give rise to the same geographical constraints as economic activities producing
tangible goods. Second, uncertainty can also prove strong when firms operate within
emerging markets whose history is too short to provide sufficient information with a
view to efficient individual location decision-making. Third, it can be strong when, in
emerging high-tech sectors, the direction of technological development, the emerging
technological standard and the identification of the main players are not well-defined
(Nooteboom and Woolthuis, 2005). This situation is typical of the Internet industry and
the start-up boom of the late nineties. Indeed, in the sector’s structuring phase, there
was strong uncertainty with respect to the emerging standard, demand, organizational
practices, firm valuation, as well as in terms of location strategies. In such a context,
firms, and their managers, are sensitive to signals derived from the location strategies of
other firms they regard as undergoing similar economic constraints. As a matter of fact,
cognitively close firms may enter into a locational cascade (Vicente and Suire, 2007)
when they choose their location sequentially and follow predecessors they consider
better informed. These mimetic behaviors, which are based on an observational-
learning process (Manski, 2000), engender a kind of locational isomorphism (Appold,
2005) which may give rise to a cluster of firms, even if the first adopters’ location choice
merely proceeded from random decision-making.
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technological constraints, but of individual decisions under social influence. This
process is cumulative due to the increasing social pressure an area undergoes as the
number of firms belonging to the same organizational field increases. The legitimacy of
individual location decision-making is even stronger when the symbolical role of the
emerging locational norm is strong. Within the framework of an empirical study on
the French Silicon Sentier, Vicente et al. (2007) have underlined that, in spite of
the nonexistence of technological relations among firms, the location’s symbolical role
had been instrumental in helping dotcom entrepreneurs to attract venture capital
funds. The reason is that venture capitalists too experience uncertainty in terms of
dotcoms’ business model, and they infer that successful places certainly house more
successful firms than others.
The probability of a locational cascade occurring in a given area rather than in
another also depends on the first adopters’ influence. The signal which the first adopters
send will impact more the location decision-making of others if they are perceived as
‘fashion leaders’ in the organizational or industrial field. The less anonymous the first
adopters are, the stronger is the geographical charisma of the place. The followers are
thus convinced that to be located elsewhere could turn out to be a strategic error, so
that a locational norm emerges rapidly, which sometimes comes as a surprise for the
policy makers and local elites concerned. Again, some stylized facts seem to back up
this proposition. In the case of the Silicon Sentier for instance, the location of
Yahoo.fr (1997), followed closely by Lycos.fr and Nomade.fr in 1998,
4 had generated
a locational cascade (or bubble) with the establishment of some 300 more or less
anonymous dotcoms up to 2000. The Silicon Sentier thus became rapidly the locational
norm for French dotcoms. This self-organized phenomenon had been favored by the
media, which would not have been the case if the first adopters had not been (or
supposed to be) the most successful dotcoms at the time. Locational cascades can also
be ‘pushed’ by local elites. By way of example, in the late seventies, the instigators of the
Sophia Antipolis research park had pointed to the location of IBM and Texas
Instruments plants, within the framework of the project’s marketing strategy, with a
view to attracting other plants of computer and telecommunications big companies
(Longhi, 1999).
Proposition 2: A cluster will exhibit stronger stability if the network effect prevails over the
informational effect in the colocation process. The level of cognitive distance is the associated
critical parameter of the clusters’ stability properties.
Uncertainty decrease and the search for legitimacy could provide interesting
explanations on the reasons why clusters emerge as locational norms. Nevertheless,
the geographical charisma of clusters—the fact that some high-tech places are in
fashion—is not a guarantee of long-term success and aggregate performance. This
proposition can partly be justified by the evolving payoff properties governing the
convergence process of location decision-making. The intrinsic stability of clusters will
depend on the balance between the firms’ individual motives for establishing themselves
4 Note that these three companies are cognitively close—three Internet portal companies—which confirms
the argument according to which colocation processes under uncertainty and legitimacy lead to a low level
of cognitive distance.
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firms converge rapidly upon the same site and may thus gain legitimacy in the short
term. But the collective pattern is fragile, especially on account of the nonevolving
payoff structure as mentioned above. Conversely, when network effects prevail over
informational or signaling effects, the colocation of firms is the result of a sequential
process in which firms compare the benefits of each place according to their own
preferences, as well as according to the predecessors’ location which they consider
relevant in terms of knowledge production function.
In the peculiar case of clustering processes, how can we explain the differentiated
evolution of the payoff structure between clusters emerging from locational cascades
and clusters in which knowledge networks prevail? The level of cognitive distance
between firms provides some convincing explanations in this regard. Again it is to be
pointed out that the level of cognitive distance is related to the firms’ motives for
establishing themselves close to others. Uncertainty and legitimacy can imply a low level
of cognitive distance insofar as the signaling effect functions mainly among firms with
close industrial or market—and so knowledge—characteristics. This argument is
consistent with the definition of an organizational field as developed in Di Maggio and
Powell’s explanation of mimetic isomorphism. Firms are only inclined to emulate those
which they regard as facing the same market and knowledge constraints, and so the
same problems in terms of location decision-making. If the location aggregation process
retroacts positively on each firm’s individual legitimacy, it also increases the risks
of unintended knowledge spillovers (Boschma, 2005), thus bringing about knowledge
appropriation defaults (Brossard and Vicente, 2007). So it appears that, against the
trend of the literature, clustering processes based on these individual motives may give
rise to a climate of mistrust and suspicion due to too strong a cognitive proximity
between firms. Knowledge outflows are more risky if geographically close firms are
cognitively close so that they exhibit similar absorptive capabilities (Nooteboon, 2000).
This climate of suspicion may consequently engender cluster instability. On the other
hand, when clustering processes are dominated by the firms’ motives for having access
to external pieces of complementary knowledge, the level of cognitive distance is higher
than in the previous case (i.e. the case where clusters arise from locational cascades). In
a complex and systemic view of knowledge (Antonelli, 2005; Sorenson et al., 2006),
firms establish their innovation strategies by combining internal and external
knowledge within networks. When choosing their location, they need to take into
consideration their motives for both maintaining sufficient internal knowledge
appropriability and facilitating external knowledge accessibility. So, clusters may
emerge with a certain amount of cognitive distance when firms value knowledge
accessibility over knowledge appropriability, and locate close to others with a view to
finding partners in technological fields where knowledge is fragmented into many
technological areas. Geographical proximity is needed in these situations due to the
difference in absorptive capabilities between the various partners concerned, which calls
for frequent meetings and engineers’ mobility in order to favor mutual understanding
(Nooteboon, 2000) and the diffusion of tacit knowledge through social networks.
Relational thickness is therefore stronger in clusters where knowledge networks prevail
than in clusters based on locational cascades. Relations are facilitated by the fact that
firms do not originally compete in the same markets, and so the risks of unintended
knowledge outflows are lower than in the previous case. Trust thus emerges more easily
8o f2 4 . Suire and Vicenteand insures a higher dynamic stability for clusters based on knowledge networks than
for clusters based on locational cascades.
Empirical evidence seems to back up such a proposition. When uncertainty and
legitimacy through the informational effect prevail in the emergence of clusters,
collective efficiency is far from being proved. In the case of US science parks, Appold
(2005) reveals that clusters can emerge without functional interdependences among
firms, and he further mentions that the cumulative location process, in spite of the
geographical charisma, does not necessarily enhance collective and organizational
efficiency. Dalla Pria and Vicente (2005) and Vicente and Suire (2007) emphasize that
the sudden decline of the fashionable French Silicon Sentier was partly due to an excess
of competition and the resulting nonexistence of knowledge relations among cognitively
close firms. The climate of suspicion and the risks of unintended knowledge outflows
were particularly perceptible when entrepreneurs acknowledged that they did not want
to send their employees to represent their start-up at First Tuesday meetings
5 on
account of their being courted by other start-ups. The relocation of Yahoo.fr in 2000,
during the Internet bubble’s crash, quickly resulted in a cascade of relocations until the
Silicon Sentier became the Silicon desert.
6 Another interesting case is that concerning
the French cluster of Sophia Antipolis (Longhi, 1999), which chronologically displays
the two aforementioned effects. First, the intensive international marketing policy
promoting the site and the initial locations of IBM and Texas Instruments plants
generated a strong mimetic locational isomorphism close to the one identified by
Appold in the US. After this period of growth, the cluster entered into a phase of
stagnation in the early nineties due to the nonexistence of knowledge relations.
Nevertheless, benefiting from a critical mass of firms located in the area, local policy
makers, who were conscious that geographical proximity is not sufficient to generate
collective value added, then proceeded to favor network relations among firms
stemming from the software, hardware and telecommunications industry. The
technological complementarities between these firms thus led to the emergence of the
so-called Telecom Valley, which appears nowadays as a famous and attractive
European place dedicated to secure communications technologies (Longhi et al., 2004).
These two simple propositions open up perspectives which allow us to enter
differently from the major part of the literature into the black box of local knowledge
spillovers. They emphasize the fact that location decision externalities precede local
knowledge spillovers, so that the latter can have ambivalent effects on the stability and
aggregate performance of clusters. They highlight de facto the critical parameters of
cluster dynamics: (i) the firms’ motives and incentives for convergence upon location
decision-making and the resulting level of cognitive distance between colocated firms,
5 An informal networking forum intended for technology entrepreneurs, companies seeking venture capital
and investors.
6 Dalla Pria and Vicente (2006) have identified the reasons for the rapid success and then the sudden decline
of the Silicon Sentier through a sociological approach based on a series of 70 semi-structured interviews.
They have shown that the bankruptcy of some firms only explains a small part of this decline. According
to us the departure of Yahoo.fr sent a negative signal to the firms that remained—i.e. those that survived
the Internet bubble crash. As a result, these firms decided to relocate their activities in other areas of Paris.
Six months after the bubble crash the very entrepreneurs who had previously promoted the cluster were
declaring: ‘There was no Silicon Sentier religion for me. It’s just convenient and cheap, but it has given its
members a bad image’, ‘The Silicon Sentier is now the silicon desert’, or ‘Today, this place symbolizes the
start up chaos and the excesses of the new economy (1990s)’ (Dalla Pria and Vicente, 2006).
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influence on the location decision-making of others.
These are key parameters in that they allow us to understand cluster formation and
stability. The following sections put forward a simulation-based model which includes
these parameters and tests these propositions by associating clusters with locational
norms. Simulation-based models are particularly well suited as they provide useful
results that capture the evolutionary pathways we have identified in the aforementioned
case studies. They make it possible to discuss the relations between the individual
parameters of location decision-making and the resulting collective structures. These
relations should prove useful in conducting, in an evolutionary framework, more
systematic empirical studies on clusters.
5. A simple model of locational norm stability
In the tradition of sociology (Granovetter, 1978; Schelling, 1978; Hedstrom, 1998) and
economics (Orle ´ an, 2006), the purpose of this section is to model individual binary
decision under social influence constraint. In line with Lopez-Pintado and Watts (2008),
it is clear that, as addressed above, location decision-making can be interpreted in terms
of different motivations. In order to propose a general norm location dynamics
modeling framework, we first need to categorize the origin of decision externalities. To
that end, we distinguish between two types of decisions:
(i) Decisions taken within the scope of a search for strategic complementarity, arising
when a firm’s utility over a particular location is a positive function of the number
of other firms choosing this alternative (the network externality effect);
(ii) Decisions taken within the scope of a search for legitimacy, arising as a result of
inferences which firms draw from information regarding the decisions reached by
other firms [the informational (or reputational) effect].
As Lopez-Pintado and Watts (2008) have underlined, these two types of externalities
cannot, most of the time, be derived from a unified framework. Nevertheless, our
following proposal tries to capture both mechanisms of social influence through the use
of an influence response function.
To formalize our approach clearly, we put forward a conditional decision-making
model in line with Granovetter (1978). We assume that any given firm i 2 N has to
make a norm location choice ðdiÞ conditional upon the decisions of one or more other
firms ðdjÞ with j 2 Nnfig. In view of a decision which can be described in two
dimensions,
7 i.e. D ¼f 0,1g and di 2 D, a conditional decision model posits:
Pr di ¼ 1 ðÞ ¼ fd j
  
Thus, if each decision is viewed as a sequential and discrete point in time, the decision
of firm i at time t depends at least partly on the decision of firms j at time t   1.
As underlined by Watts (2006), both Schelling (1978) and Granovetter (1978) have
7 It is to be noted that extending our model so that it is based on a wider range of strategies does not modify
our qualitative results.
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of the fact that (i) many decisions are binary by nature, and (ii) more multifaceted
decisions can effectively be reduced to binary decisions: on the one hand, conforming
to the majority norm versus choosing one among many possible alternatives and, on
the other hand, locating in the emergent or dominant cluster versus opting for an
alternative location. For the purposes of our analysis, as well as for reasons of
tractability, we retain two norm location choices.
For any firm i 6¼ j, let   dj6¼i ¼ð d1,...,di 1,diþ1,...,dnÞ2DN 1 be the action profile
representing the behavior of the remaining firms in the population. We define a
function Pi : DN 1 !½ 0,1  so that Pið   dj6¼iÞ is firm i’s probability of choosing the 1-norm
location given the strategies   dj6¼i of the remaining firms, with Pið   dj6¼iÞ2½ 0,1  in case of
continuous probability.
We introduce a relevant neighbor principle (or interaction neighborhood) in order
to model the limited rationality of firms (David, 1988; Kirman, 1997). Indeed, except
for some emergent territories where there are very few firms established, many
clusters are more or less dense. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that new entrants
cannot rebuild the historical sequence of discrete location due to a lack of cognitive
capacity, or simply due to the fact that this public information is not available. To
put it differently, this relevant neighbor principle is viewed as one of the idiosyncratic
characteristics of firm i. Following Watts (2006), we then consider a function pi
denoted as the influence response function, so that:
Pi   dj6¼i
  
¼ pi ki   dj6¼i
     
2 0,1 ½ 
where ki is the level of decision externalities or social signal in the words of Watts (2006).
This neighborhood influence on firm i’s decision is defined as follows:






Firms are located within a two-dimension graph interaction
8 and we consider a
von Neumann neighborhood in such a way that the decision of any firm i is
conditional upon the decision of the four nearest neighbors. As a consequence, the
social signal level can only be kið   dj6¼iÞ2½ 0,1,2,3,4 . Thus, each firm can benefit from
a signal, a decision externality that may vary from 0 to 4. In a case where the influence
structure is supposed to be undirected and unweighted, previous specifications simply
mean that the probability of choosing the 1-norm location is dependent upon the
number of firms choosing the 1-norm location in the neighborhood. In the presence of
positive externalities, the more strategy 1 is adopted within the neighborhood, the
higher the probability is for a firm i to switch to strategy 1.
Finally, we assume that any firm i 2 N is characterized by a utility function uiðdi,kiÞ
so that both the social influence and private strategy of firm i are arguments of
the payoff function. If we note  U ¼ uið1,kiÞ uið0,kiÞ, a rational firm i will choose
the 1-norm location if  U > 0 and keep its initial strategy otherwise.
8 Firms are located within a torus in Z
2.
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The previous function determines the aggregate behavior of firms. Different
equilibriums can be computed according to this function’s critical parameters.
In what follows, we propose to consider a stochastic influence response function.
There are many reasons why firms behave stochastically. We may, for instance, refer
to uncertainty as to the ex post value of the d-norm location, the signal or the
characteristics of other players. But, as mentioned above, the reason we could also put
forward is the sector’s immaturity and the resulting lack of industrial standard.
Formally, the utility associated with strategy 1 for a firm i is then uið1,kiÞ¼’1ðkiÞþ"1
where ’1ð:Þ is supposed to be increasing with respect to ki and is then related to peer
pressure effect or social influence level. "1 is a random term. Symmetrically, the utility
associated with the 0-norm location for a firm i is uið0,kiÞ¼’0ðkiÞþ"0 whereas ’0ð:Þ
decreases with respect to ki.
Following our above considerations:
 U > 0 , ui 1,ki ðÞ   ui 0,ki ðÞ > 0
, ’1 ki ðÞ þ "1   ’0 ki ðÞ   "0 > 0
, ’1 ki ðÞ   ’0 ki ðÞ ðÞ þ "1   "0 ðÞ > 0
,  1 ki ðÞ    0 ki ðÞ ðÞ > 0
with  1 ki ðÞ ¼ ’1 ki ðÞ þ "1 and  0 ki ðÞ ¼ ’0 ki ðÞ þ "0
The individual decision depends on the difference of both social signals and the
specific forms of the functions  1ðkiÞ and  0ðkiÞ. Finally, previous piðkiÞ is formally
defined as:
pi ki ðÞ ¼ 1 ki ðÞ    0 ki ðÞ ðÞ
To illustrate this mechanism, we propose polar deterministic cases in which piðkiÞ is the
probability of firm i’s adopting the 1-norm location when exactly k firms within
the neighborhood adopt this strategy.
9 The positive externalities simply mean that
the higher the overall number of adopters of the 1-norm location, the higher the
probability of adopting the 1-norm location.
Case 1: a linear increasing probability means that the probability of firm i’s adopting
the 1-norm location increases monotically as the strategy spreads in the neighborhood.
In that case, the cluster will develop linearly with the number of firms within a specific
sector (Figure 1).
A more convincing specification consists in considering a threshold model
a` la Granovetter (1978). Thus, before adopting a given dominant strategy, firms
may ‘wait’ for a more or less long time until it spreads within the neighborhood.
Many documented situations can be interpreted in that way. Among others, we
may quote Granovetter’s well-known model (1978) on collective rioting, the
informational cascades of Bikhchandani et al., or Hedstrom’s (1998) rational
imitation model. Concerning clusters, we may argue that an emerging sector and an
9 In this article, we only considered the case of positive externalities. There obviously are many situations
where territories are characterized by negative externalities or diseconomies of agglomeration resulting
from congestion effects. This case will be the subject of further work later on.
12 of 24 . Suire and Vicenteunstable knowledge base, as well as unidentified leading players, can give rise to such a
behavior.
Case 2: a threshold behavior means that below an alternative strategy’s diffusion
threshold ðkT
i Þ, firm i does not adopt the 1-norm location. Strategy 1 is then chosen
if ki   kT
i .
The following figure represents a case where kT
i ¼ 2 means that below 50%, firm i
does not switch to the 1-norm location: piðkiÞ¼0. Conversely, we logically get
piðkiÞ¼1 as soon as two firms adopt the 1-norm location strategy (Figure 2).
Finally, as has been mentioned above, we address the question of a more generalized
behavior through a stochastic influence response function in order to capture
better what should be the life cycle of a cluster (Menzel and Fornahl, 2007;
Ter Wal and Boshma, 2007). To that end, we impose only two conditions upon piðkiÞ:
Assumption 1:pi ki ðÞ 2 0,1  ½
Assumption 2: pið0Þ < pið1Þ < pið2Þ < pið3Þ < pið4Þ in order to respect a principle
of cumulative interaction and the idea that the higher the number of firms’ choosing the
1-norm location in the neighborhood, the higher the probability of choosing this
strategy.
Finally, as our model is symmetric, we also have
pið3Þ¼1   p1ð1Þ
pið4Þ¼1   pið0Þ
 
and, as a
consequence, we are left with three critical parameters fpið0Þ,pið1Þ,pið2Þg which we can






























Figure 1. Conditional and linear behavior.
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Following previous works on informational cascades for instance (Banerjee, 1992;
Bikhchandani et al., 1998), agents tend to forget their private signal about a strategy as
soon as the information-concerning actions taken by other firms in the population is
used by them to reduce uncertainty and infer optimal choice. When firms fail to
distinguish between alternative locational returns, the number of firms located in a
territory may be perceived as a signal of the ‘quality’ or ‘geographical charisma’ of the
place. Signals are regarded as ‘activities or attributes of individuals [...] which by design
or accident, alter the beliefs of, or convey information to, other individuals’ (Spence,
1974). As reminded by Appold (2005), ‘institutional theory suggests that the action of
similar firms that have faced the same situation in the past provides credible behavioral
clues in the absence of direct information’. The presence of similar firms may serve as
a ‘filter’ to distinguish between good and bad choice options. Indeed, the presence of
successful similar firms located at a particular site could be a good indicator of the
place’s collective performance, without it being necessarily possible to understand why.
As has previously been suggested, these places are characterized by a strong cognitive
proximity. Following these considerations, we propose to compute the influence of
response function in a particular way with a view to simulating the collective outcome
of this decision process.
When a firm is faced with both strategies under uncertainty, a rational choice is a
random draw between the two. We model this proposition considering that for a typical
firm i, pið2Þ¼0:5 means that when both strategies are equally adopted in the
neighborhood, the probability of choosing the 1-norm location is then 0.5. However, it
is important to introduce two more parameters in order to describe the profile action
under uncertainty. On the one hand, we consider that some firms may have more
legitimacy (real or supposed to be real) than others. In that case, when a firm i is
confronted with a ‘fashion leader’, it weights the fashion leader’s signal with a
probability pið1Þ. Under Assumption 2, the higher this probability is, the more the
‘fashion leader’ is weighted within the neighborhood. On the other hand, if we imagine
a stable collective belief system where each firm adopts the 0-norm location, an
unconditional behavior with a nonnull probability is necessary in order to start the
colocation process pið0Þ > 0. To sum up, fpið0Þ,pið1Þg models both the probability of a
pioneer’s behavior
10 as well as this pioneer’s credibility through the influence of its
behavior on the decision of followers.
Our simulation protocol is strictly similar to Schelling’s (1971). The dynamics of
collective diffusion is obtained by drawing, at each time step, one firm from a
population sized N¼2500 whose adoption probability, as a function of its neighbor-
hood, is then denoted as piðkiÞ. This stochastic interaction model is a sequential and
cumulative action model (Cox and Durrett, 1991).
Different conjectures emerge from our different simulations, which could be
connected with the empirical observation. On the one hand, when cognitive proximity
is high but the fashion leader’s legitimacy is rather low, the 1-norm location never
10 We could as well consider the case of a firm being responsible for the creation of a disruptive innovation
for instance.
14 of 24 . Suire and Vicentebecomes a dominant strategy within the population (Figure 3). We model this
conjecture with the following parameters over t¼1000 period:
pi 0 ðÞ ;pi 1 ðÞ ;pi 2 ðÞ
  
¼ 0:002;0:04;0:5 fg
In that case, the 1-norm location never spreads through the population. Indeed, under
uncertainty, firms do not consider getting higher utility by ‘following’ a fashion leader
whose legitimacy is rather low. In short, the signal’s credibility is not sufficient to
counterbalance the strategy adopted by firms, and these do not anticipate significant
benefits from such a switch, so that:  U   0.
On the other hand, if this legitimacy becomes more important, the fashion leader
comes to be more weighted in the neighborhood, and the 1-norm location becomes a
plausible alternative, except when uncertainty prevails. In the event of an informational
cascade, indeed, stability is not assured and the collective outcome is unstable
(Figure 4). This influence response function captures such a scenario with:
pi 0 ðÞ ;pi 1 ðÞ ;pi 2 ðÞ
  
¼ 0:002;0:15;0:5 fg
We find close results when increasing pioneer’s behavior pið0Þ with the two following
‘fashion leader’ effects weighted differently (Figures 5 and 6):


































































Figure 4. Few first pioneers with low contagion.
A social interaction model of cluster viability . 15 of 24Furthermore, it could be interesting to confront the respective weight of fashion leader
and legitimacy effects and capture threshold effects on the norm-location dynamics.
The following figure (Figure 7) proposes for each couple of (p(0), p(1))
11 the mean
proportion of firms adopting 1-norm location. There is a discontinuity between what it
appears to be two different regimes. For some rather low values of p(0) and p(1), i.e a
regime in which fashion leader effects as well as pioneer behaviors are rare, the system
remains lock into the 0-norm location. On contrary, as soon as disruptive behaviors
appear [p(0) increases] and these behaviors appear to be credible for the population
[p(1) increases], the system passes through a brutal phase transition and converges to a
state where both norms coexist.
In addition, the phase transition does not appear for the same values of p(0) and p(1)
meaning that there would exist a relationship between these two critical parameters
(Figure 8). In order to lock-out the dominant norm location, both behaviors are
necessary. But it appears graphically that p(0) is more important that p(1) to start the
phase transition. For a low p(0) one need a high p(1) whereas the phase transition
occurs quicker for a couple of high p(0) whatever the value of p(1). That means that
disruptive or pioneer behaviors are more important than fashion leader effects in order
to start the phase transition.
During the development of a technological field, which is characterized by a high
level of uncertainty, the principles of informational legitimacy and contagion are central





























Figure 5. Numerous pioneers with low contagion.





























Figure 6. Numerous pioneers with high contagion.
11 We restrict to some value for p(0) and p(1) inferior to 0.25 as results for higher values do not provide
more information.
16 of 24 . Suire and Vicentemechanisms that determine the convergence toward a technological norm. The
simulation results exhibit different interesting patterns. First, we observe that location
norm 1 never spreads across the population for an important range of values for p(0)
and p(1). This is typical of mature clusters in which individual disruptive behaviors are
very rare. But as soon as the probability of pioneer or disruptive behavior occurring
increases, and when this type of behavior is considered legitimate by the other firms,
then the system enters into an unstable phase transition regime. If the benefits derived
from the disruptive behavior or the associated technological innovation do not exist,
then the firms revise their choices and the probability of this behavior occurring
decreases and the system returns to the state where location norm 0 is dominant. In the
same way, the dynamic is the same if legitimacy decreases during the transitory regime.
Finally, a legitimacy-based mimetic process can cause a rapid change in the location
Figure 8. Diffusion of norm location.
Figure 7. Phase transition.
A social interaction model of cluster viability . 17 of 24norm when the pioneers’ reputation remains strong. But location norm 1 can, at best,
coexist with the previous one, but does not spread across the population. But the system
can get ‘stuck’ in this state because the excessive cognitive proximity between firms and
the homophilic behavior they foster generates a level of distrust that hinders openness
and creative knowledge exchanges (Fleming and Marx, 2006; Nooteboom, 2006). As far
as we know, many clusters can be affected by this type of situation where uncertainty
and strong cognitive proximity prevent collective innovation and undermine cluster
growth (Longhi, 1999; Appold, 2005; Vicente and Suire, 2007). To put it differently, the
absence of a well-established standard, on the basis of which firms may benefit mutually
from their colocation, can lead to these forms of clustering process. Clusters need to
generate network externalities in order to become a new location standard.
5.3. Decision externalities under strategic complementarities and cognitive
distance
Up to now, we have only examined the case of uncertainty situations and the resulting
informational and reputational effect. We have highlighted the typical collective
outcome that may emerge from these individual decisions. Now, it is to be pointed out
again that many clusters arise as well out of firms’ search for accessibility to the
knowledge base, technological complementarities and technological convergence. The
idea is that ‘efficient clusters’ are clusters exhibiting a related variety (Boschma and
Iammarino, 2007; Frenken et al., 2007). From an individual point of view, the utility
assigned to a firm depends explicitly on the relative number of firms choosing the
1-norm location. The technology adoption model of Katz and Shapiro (1985), which
rests on the role played by positive network externalities, basically is a good example of
decision externalities with strategic complementarities. Clusters exhibiting this collective
property are Silicon Valley-type clusters where the colocation process is dominated by
the search for complementary activities, the sharing of nonredundant knowledge, or the
access to a knowledge base growing with the number of firms located within the cluster.
The collective outcomes are radically different in this case. The following simulations
address this issue.
In order to take into account the possibility of increasing returns through the
adoption of the 1-norm location strategy, we have to set influence response function
pið2Þ at a level strictly superior to 1/2. This situation means that when both strategies are
equally adopted within a neighborhood, firm i will switch to the 1-norm location
strategy with a greater than 1/2 probability. Then, pið2Þ > 1=2 captures the idea that,
when the network effect associated with the benefits firms can gain from their
complementary neighbors is stronger in the alternative location, firms are not
indifferent any more to both of the locational alternatives when these are equally
distributed in their neighborhood.
We consider a first case where the cluster resulting from adoption of the 1-norm
location exhibits two main characteristics. The first is about the rather low
agglomeration speed, while the second relates to a weak fashion leader effect. Note
that these two elements are often correlated in the case of clusters where the process of
open technological collaboration needs a long time to occur, especially if gatekeeper
firms are absent (Fleming and Marx 2006) or mistrust highly present. Along the same
lines, the weakness of technological interdependence can be the consequence of too
18 of 24 . Suire and Vicentestrong cognitive proximity (Figure 9). The following influence response function
captures this scenario over t¼2200 period:
pi 0 ðÞ ;pi 1 ðÞ ;pi 2 ðÞ
  
¼ 0:002;0:11;0:55 fg
This situation is typical of clusters where individual utility does not increase quickly
with collective adoption. Nevertheless, the collective outcome appears to be highly
stable. Industrial sectors where technology is not mature, or collaborative research and
development are supported by a nonoptimal cognitive distance (Nooteboom et al.,
2005) can be illustrative of such a low process. But, contrary to the former case, a
standard of location arises at some point in time with the emergence of a critical mass of
firms at sufficient cognitive distance.
The two following figures (Figures 10 and 11) are obtained by increasing gradually
the weight of the network effect:




pi 0 ðÞ ;pi 1 ðÞ ;pi 2 ðÞ
  
¼ 0:002;0:11;0:7 fg
Beyond any doubt, the stability of emerging clusters is once again confirmed, and
the speed of the contagion process increases as the network effect increases.
12
The following figure (Figure 12) is the spatial diffusion process with
fpið0Þ;pið1Þ;pið2Þg ¼ f0:002;0:11;0:6g few firms innovate by adopting a disruptive
behavior. A technological field emerges thanks to the aggregation of various bricks of
knowledge. In the process of diffusion of a location norm, some firms appear to play a
crucial role; they find themselves, at a moment in time, at the intersection of two
technologies and their decisions will determine the transition toward a new norm. The
higher the legitimacy of these gatekeeper firms, the higher the individual probability to
switch to a more profitable technological process. Thus, some technological cliques are
a necessary condition for the emergence of a sigmoid diffusion process. The growths of
cliques lead to a critical mass of firms adopting location norm 1 and characterize the





























Figure 9. Clustering dynamics with weak network effect.
12 The increasing values of p(0) and p(1) display, as in the previous simulations, the speed of the
convergence process, without there being any consequence on the stability of the aggregate structure.
A social interaction model of cluster viability . 19 of 24on the size of the population and the interaction structure between firms. If some
pioneer behavior is a necessary condition for the emergence of a new location norm, the
existence of a structure of interaction between the firms explains the emergence of
knowledge cliques; and then the structuration through aggregation occurs thanks to the
key role played by the gatekeeper firms.
Consequently, an emerging cluster is highly attractive as a result of the increasing
payoffs firms gain from better knowledge accessibility and technological cross-
absorption. The stability of the locational standard can then be correlated with the
growing diffusion of a standard within a technological field (Aoki and Takizawa, 2002).
Indeed, in technological fields where firms face constraints of compatibility,
interoperability and modularity among many fragmented pieces of internal and
external knowledge, the process of tacit knowledge exchange requires mutual
understanding, as well as additional R&D phases with a view to technological
integration examination (Brossard and Vicente, 2007). It therefore being risky and
inefficient for firms to locate away from others. This result is consistent with the main
explanation that Saxenian (1994) provided concerning the reasons for the continuous
growth of the Silicon Valley over more than half a century: ‘Silicon Valley is a regional
network-based industrial system that promotes collective learning and flexible adjustment
among specialist producers of a complex of related technologies.’
6. Synthesis and concluding remarks
In this article, we started by setting out that location decision externalities precede local
knowledge spillovers in the explanation of cluster aggregate efficiency. Behind this


























































Figure 11. Clustering dynamics with strong network effect.
20 of 24 . Suire and Vicenteof others invariably generate knowledge spillovers which, according to the nature of
these motives, may have ambivalent effects on the stability and performance of clusters.
We have identified two main motives for firms to enter into a herding locational
behavior: uncertainty and legitimacy on the one hand, and network and knowledge
accessibility on the other hand, each one of these effects implying a distinctive amount
of cognitive distance between firms. Two propositions have been put forward and tested
in order to study the clustering process under location decision externalities and capture
these ambivalent effects.
Our two general propositions seem to be validated by our simulation results. First
of all, the model confirms Proposition 1 according to which the weight of the
informational and legitimacy effects strongly influences the speed of the clustering
process. This is consistent with the main stylized facts on clusters’ (short or long)
success stories. Clusters gain a sort of symbolical capital from the location of some




Figure 12. Spatial diffusion of norm location.
A social interaction model of cluster viability . 21 of 24adopters are identified as ‘fashion leaders’, the higher is the probability of a locational
cascade occurring, with cognitively close firms gathering in order to benefit from the
cluster’s growing reputation and geographical charisma. Proposition 2 is validated by
the model as well. Indeed, depending on the respective weight of the informational and
network effects, clusters will display diametrically opposite dynamic stability properties.
When the informational effect prevails, the aggregate outcome does not converge on
the 1-norm location and is highly unstable, unlike the network effect which engenders
a strong dynamic stability of the 1-norm location. Of course, these results are highly
sensitive to the assumptions on our formal configurations of location decision
externalities, particularly to the ones concerning the small variations of p(2).
However, as in the social interaction models a` la Schelling or Granovetter, these
results show that there is no direct correspondence between individual preferences for
places and the emerging collective structure. Again, this is consistent with empirical
evidence on long-term performances cluster’s. The colocation of complementary (and
so cognitively distant) firms is particularly suited to the network-based management of
intended knowledge spillovers. In technological fields where the composite dimensions
of innovations require that different pieces of compatible knowledge are put together
through colocation, firms can improve their external knowledge accessibility without
reducing strongly their internal knowledge appropriation. Conversely, when the
informational and reputational effects prevail, the outcome of colocation can display
an excess of cognitive proximity so that the risks of unintended spillovers engender
knowledge under-appropriation, a climate of mistrust, as well as tensions on the local
labor market. Finally, the balance between these two effects could represent a suitable
indicator of the dynamic stability of clusters.
Our results corroborate the current growing trend which acknowledges that clusters
are not a panacea (Martin and Sunley, 2003) for knowledge-based economies. This
trend is confirmed by a recent related literature according to which the geographical
charisma of clusters is not a condition of their aggregate performance (Appold, 2005;
Vicente and Suire, 2007), and that the evolving knowledge and network structures of
clusters are an appropriate yardstick of clusters’ life cycles (Menzel and Fornhal, 2007;
Ter Wal and Boschma, 2007).
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